Operation 'Hot Box' was released in October 1953 and contains the full description of the measurements and procedures carried out at St.Athen in December, 1953.
The 'Dogstar' aircraft decontamination was complicated by the fact that the atmosphere in the Pacific was very humid and there was much sea-water corrosion on the surface of the aircraft and inside the engines. This combined with the peculiar type of fall-out which was mainly vapourised coral, made the decontamination of the aircraft and of the engines much more difficult.
Due to the contamination of the engines, it is recommended that the engine should be disposed of at sea, because of the man hours involved in de-contaminating it.
Instrumentation on WH 738
instruments for 0-10, 0-100, 0-1,000, 0-10,000 r.p.h were installed.
The recorders were switched on one minute from H+6, the arranged time of entry.
'After about 50 seconds, the 0-10 and 0-100 instruments went off scale
and the 0-1,000 swung nearly off. We turned away and made
a re-entry 3 minutes later for complete penetration, and on
this occasion the three rate meters swung violently off scale
and the 0-10,000 was oscillating in the region
of 1,500 - 2,000 r.p.h.'
Each individual (three) was supplied with two packs of film, on the standard red pack of film and the other a special pack. The pilot has 21r on his dosimeter and the navigator 19r. It was unfortunate that we did not have the use of some of the existing 0-50 instruments.
"On the film badge packs when developed, the total dosage
was almost exactly half. I am unable to say why this large discrepancy
exists but am awaiting the return of our actual instruments for A.E.R.E investigation. However, as the film pack doses were more in
keeping with the M.O.S. requirements (and our calculations)
we decided to use those until the matter had been cleared."
Decontamination of WH 738
There was a high rate of radiation chiefly Beta on the surface of the aircraft, especially the perspex nose, leading edges of the wings and engine lacelles.
"Three ground crew dressed in full protective clothing with the
exception of Respirators and protective hoods
started off the decontamination."
The dosages on the aircraft were high, i.e. more than 3,000 c.p.s the cockpit tolerance was below 12.5 m.r per hour, thus showing it would be possible to refuel and fly the aircraft immediately without great hazard to the servicing and arming crews.
The aircraft was then left for 48-hours, at the end of this period (a weekend) the dosage rates of the aircraft had decayed as expected, but it was not found easy to further decontaminate the aircraft and smears still gave off a reading of over 2,000 c.p.s.
For security reasons, it was not considered advisable to let this state of affairs continue, and the aircraft was then taken out again on the runway and manually scrubbed down - a proceeding which employed the six of us for 48 working hours.
The area around the bleed valve was highly contaminated. One impellor gave a reading over 500 c.p.s which was put in a creasol bath and left for the maximum period, when although no smear samples could be taken from it, it was still reading over 200 c.p.s.
MOSAIC: DECONTAMINATION OF AIRCRAFT
All solid waste above the tolerance figure will be sealed in steel drums and transhipped to Maralinga for subsequent disposal on Buffalo. Most of the active waste will be in the form of sludges which can be packed in petrol drums.
It should be stressed that there will be no hosing of active aircraft and consequent widespread drift of contaminated spray. All treatments are local hand scrubbing methods.
Conclusion
Instrumentation housed in the aircraft was off the scale, up to 2,5000 r.p.h was recorded during sampling missions, yet the personal dosimeters were not accurate and only recorded a dose equal to 50%, yet these were the measurements used as they were closer to the M.O.S. figures.
Decontamination crews inhaling Beta radiation as they were not supplied with any respirators or hoods to decontaminate the aircraft. Aircraft requiring 48 hours of de-contamination to provide a safe environment, hand scrubbing the aircraft to ensure that they could be put back into service.
The Ministry of Defence always state that the Health and Safety precautions were of the highest standards, yet the decontamination crews did not have respirators, the dosimeters were inaccurate and when the radioactive waste needed to be disposed off, it was put in barrels and buried at Maralinga.
The operation was to see how quickly the aircraft could be put back in to service at the cost of the health of the men servicing it. The aircrew being subjected to 2,500 r.p.h. Engines so contaminated that they be disposed off at sea.
The humanitarian and environmental damage inflicted by the British Government on their own servicemen and that of the sacred lands of the Aboriginal people is unbelievable, the complete disregard for anything but how fast the aircraft could be put back into service.
Just how long can the Ministry of Defence deny that they put anyone in harm's way. I am sure the current Defence Secretary Mr Grant Shapps would not volunteer to scrub down radioactive aircraft without a respirator for 48 hours.
It should be noted that the annual limit for radiation exposure for a member of the public is 1 mSv per annum or 1000 µSv per annum. If you are designated a radiation worker then you can receive up to twenty times this. I.e. 20 mSv per annum.
1 roentgen is approximately 9.3msv. So if you are exposed to 21 roentgens, this is 195msv or 195 years worth of radiation for a member of the public.
A single x-ray has 0.1mSV, so based in 21 roentgens, this is the equivalent of having 1950 x-rays all at once.
Yet the Ministry of Defence deny any responsibility. This evidence slows clearly that men were exposed and that they were collateral damage when assessing how quickly the aircraft could be put back into service.
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